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Joao De Mello and Alexandre Schneider (henceforth, DMS) present and discuss a 
remarkable social phenomenon: after increasing significantly over the 1990s, homicide 
rates in the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil, roughly halved in the first quinquennium of this 
century. Readers expecting some sort of magic policy formula to produce this fabulous 
trend would be disappointed. The authors’ explanation for the sudden drop in the 
number of homicides is as far from policy as one can get: they attribute the decline to 
long run demographic trends. 
 
DMS argue that a question of timing discards policing innovations as the most likely 
explanation of the decline, as the majority of the new policies were implemented after 
the crime rate began to fall. It should be fair to note, however, that while it is true that 
crime peaked in 1999, most of the decline occured after 2001: homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants were around 50 in 1999, about 45 in 2001 and close to 20 in 2006 (Figure 
2). The bulk of the decrease either followed or was contemporaneous with most of the 
policy innovations listed by the authors in Table 1.  
 
Also, the authors' interpretation of the decrease the arrest/population ratio namely, that 
arresting became more lax or that it just accompanied the decrease in crime rates is 
misleading. While the rate of arrests declined just 15% after 2001, homicide rates fell 
around 55%. If homicides are a proxy for crime in general, as the authors argue, then 
the probability of arrest the relevant measure for crime deterrance increased by 
around 90% (0.85/0.45=1.88). Such an increase in deterrance should appear at least as a 
serious candidate to account for some of the reduction in crime rates. 
 
One of the reasons why the authors think that something deeper than policy changes has 
been behind the bewildering fall in crime rates in Sao Paulo is the supposedely similar 
crime trend elsewhere in Brazil. These similarities, however, are on the eye of the 
beholder and in the scaling of the graphs. My own impression is that there's something 
Paulista about Sao Paulo: the decline in the homicide rate from the previous peak was 
53.5% (peaked in 1999), compared to around 18.2% in Rio (2002), 4.5% in Minas 
(2004), 2.7% in Rio Grande (2005), 9.5% in Pernambuco (2001), 8.7 in Amazonas 
(2003) and 4.7% in Goiás (2004). There is a very large Paulista specificity going on that 
demands a Paulista explanation. 
 
DMS contend that the homicide rate rose and fell hand in hand with the percentage of 
young people in Sao Paulo’s population. The share of the population in the “Trouble 
Age” (15-24) reached a maximum around 2000, as the populous cohort born around 
1980 turned 20; as this numerous “Trouble Cohort” matured, homicide rates declined.  
 
 
 As a first approach to measure the effect of age structure on homicides, DMS present 
the murder rates that would have prevailed in each year t if the age-specific homicide 
rates of a base year are applied to the age structure of that year t. This counterfactual 
estimate is compared to the actual evolution of homicide rates. The visual effect of this 
superimposition of curves (Figures 11 and 12) is impressive: actual homicide rates and 
homicide rates predicted solely by changes in age strcture move hand in hand.  
 
The unusual practice of using axes with different scaling for actual and predicted values, 
however, makes the excercise quite deceptive. A visual correspondence between the 
trends of predicted and actual homicide rates obtains only when one of the axes (actual 
rates) varies between 100 and 200 and the other spans only from 100 to 104. With the 
same age-specific murder rates of 1984, the variation in the age distribution would have 
accounted for changes in homicide rates from an index of 100 in 1984 to a maximum of 
around 104 in 1999 and back to around 100 in 2004. The curve of actual homicide rates 
shows the same inverted-U pattern, though with a much wider amplitude. Homicide 
rates reached almost 190 (1984=100) in 1999 and fell to around 150 in 2004.  
 
The bottom line should be that most of the change in overall murder rates has to be 
accounted for not by variations in age structure but in age-specific crime rates. For the 
DMS argument to be correct, an increase in the proportion of the"Trouble Age" group 
would have to lead to an increased incidence of crime among youngsters and/or among 
other age groups, a far from obvious connection on which most of the demographic 
argument should rest given the weak direct effect of age structure estimated in their 
counterfactual exercise. 
 
The authors explore econometrically the connections between age and crime across 
Paulista cities, in panel data exercises covering fifteen years. The estimates come with a 
steep age-elasticity of homicide rates – up to 5% in the highest case, implying that a 1% 
increase in the “Trouble Age” population leads to a 5% increase in homicides. Again, 
such a high number implies a change in age-specific homicide rates as a result of 
variations in age structure. It is only natural to wonder whether the omission of 
additional variables is affecting these results. For example, variables related to 
economic conditions which are discarded in the abstract but never discussed in the 
paper and to security policies harder to measure are among the most strkiking 
omissions. 
 
While demographic trends can certainly be a source of movement in crime rates in 
general and homicide rates in particular, changes in age structure normally –ie, in the 
absence of episodes such as wars or massive migrations– move at low speed. Unless 
some very powerful externalities and scale effects are at work. they are, thus, hardly 
capable of explaining wide short-run variations in aggregate crime behavior, such as the 
one observed in Sao Paulo. 
 
 
ADDENDUM FOR THE EDITOR:  
Author often quoted as "Zimiring" in the paper is actually "Zimring". 
 
 